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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday December 28, 1976

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday December 28, 1976.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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SOUTH AFRICA: Riots in Cape Town

25X1 [] Rioting in black townships near Cape Town over the Christmas holiday weekend followed patterns set in earlier outbreaks of violence in South Africa.

25X1 [] Students in the townships of Nyanga and Gugulethu just outside Cape Town had called on blacks to forgo traditional Christmas observances in favor of a period of mourning for those who died in previous riots in South Africa. Attempts by the students to enforce their call, especially on a group of black workers from Transkei, resulted in violent clashes, leaving some 24 dead and nearly 100 wounded according to official accounts. Some of the casualties may have resulted from South African police action to restore order.

25X1 [] Last August, student actions to enforce a work boycott in Soweto, the large black township near Johannesburg, resulted in violence that spread to many other localities. Some of the worst clashes were between students and workers. In a subsequent work stoppage in September, the Soweto students were better organized and able to achieve their objectives largely without violence.

25X1 [] The action near Cape Town apparently was less well organized. It now appears to be subsiding. The South African police intervened quickly and had earlier carried out sweep operations through the townships to pick up student leaders involved in the Christmas boycott call.

25X1 [] The students in the Cape Town area clearly are emulating those in Soweto, and there may have been contact between the two groups although South Africa's pass laws probably keep these to a minimum. Further outbreaks caused by student action will occur not only in the Cape Town area, but also in other black townships around South Africa's major white population centers. []

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CHINA-ROMANIA-YUGOSLAVIA: Relations

25X1 [] Chi Peng-fei, a high-ranking member of China's National People's Congress and a former foreign minister, last week completed a trip to Romania and Yugoslavia that underlined again the importance Peking attaches to good relations with the two Balkan countries. Since the early 1970s, the Chinese have cited Romania and Yugoslavia as examples of East European independence from Moscow.

25X1 [] Chinese press treatment of the trip--particularly the Romanian stop--was unusually detailed and positive. A visiting high-level Romanian delegation that was in China at the same time also received an exceptionally cordial welcome, including a meeting with Chairman Hua Kuo-feng.

25X1 [] The flurry of activity in Peking's relations with Romania and Yugoslavia comes less than a month after Soviet party chief Brezhnev visited both countries. The Chinese described the talks between Chi and the Romanians as "warm and cordial"--a characterization that contrasts sharply with the course of Brezhnev's dealings in Bucharest.

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[] In a banquet speech, Chi noted China's admiration for Romania's "revolutionary spirit of defying brute force," a phrase he had first used in 1974 to characterize Peking's enthusiasm for Romanian attempts to resist Soviet domination.

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[] While Chi was in Romania, Peking had Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan accompany the visiting Romanian group on a two-day tour of China. Yu is Peking's chief negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks. Although the Soviets viewed the recent reopening of those talks with some optimism, the Chinese have played down prospects for progress on the border dispute.

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[] Chi's visit to Yugoslavia was treated by the Chinese in lower key and there were signs of disagreement on some issues, notably over Belgrade's apparent endorsement of US-Soviet "détente." Nonetheless, the disagreements were not serious enough to prevent generally positive press treatment of Sino-Yugoslav relations.

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[] In a banquet speech, Chi praised Yugoslavia for "non-alignment" and for its vigilance against "hegemonism," a codeword for the Soviet Union. As if to underscore these points, Chinese media quoted from a recent statement by the Yugoslav defense minister calling for strengthened defenses in the event of "new conditions" in the region, implying China's approval for what it interprets as increased Yugoslav concern about Soviet intentions.

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[] The Chinese dropped any reference to Chi's membership in the Central Committee of the Communist Party when he traveled from Romania to Yugoslavia. This reflects Peking's continuing lack of relations with the Yugoslav party, which it has long considered to be "revisionist." []

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PHILIPPINES: Ceasefire Agreement

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[] //Despite a tentative agreement reached in Libya last week between Manila and the Moro National Liberation Front, a final solution to the four-year old Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines may prove to be as elusive as ever.//

25X1 [] The government has ordered a cease-fire, but we do not yet know to what extent either side has complied. The specifics of the settlement plan, moreover, have not been announced; details remain to be worked out at a follow-up meeting in February. Efforts to flesh out the agreement are likely to be contentious, and the cease-fire could come unraveled in the process. 25X1

25X1 [] //The basic problems underlying the Muslim-government confrontation are extremely difficult to solve. Cultural and religious differences created simmering unrest long before martial law was established four years ago. Tensions were significantly raised in the late 1960s and early 1970s by growing pressure from land-hungry Christian Filipinos for access to land traditionally held by Muslims. Christian incursions were abetted by the government and by sympathetic courts not inclined to honor Muslim claims to the land.//

25X1 [] //The government's attempt to disarm the Muslims in the early days of martial law not only challenged an entrenched custom but was perceived by the Muslims as an attempt to remove their ultimate defense against the encroaching Christians.//

25X1 [] //Disunity and the absence of strong leadership in the Muslim community have been further handicaps in reaching accommodation. The Muslim leaders who participated in the Libyan talks are the most radical and vocal of several groups and do

not necessarily speak for the whole Muslim community. At the same time, the more conservative traditional leaders, who might accept a fairly moderate settlement, are no longer accepted by the younger and more militant Muslim activists.//

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[] //Marcos' tentative concessions apparently were forced by threats from Qadhafi to renew his support of the Moro National Liberation Front as well as to cancel his visit to Manila scheduled for January 1977. The visit will take place before the second round of talks, and Marcos may simply be playing for time, with no intention of making serious concessions to the Front's demands.// []

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INDIA: Political Control

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[] The installation of new governments in the Indian states of Gujarat and Orissa reflects the success of Prime Minister Gandhi and her son Sanjay in gaining control over state politics in most of the country.

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[] New Delhi had relatively limited control over state politics in the past. Local politicians not only were able to modify central government actions in their states, but could use their local power to influence central decision-making in general.

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[] Last week, a state government headed by one of the Prime Minister's followers was formed in Gujarat, ending nine months of direct central rule there. The previous government--a coalition that did not include her Congress Party--fell because of defections induced by Congress. Gandhi kept the state under central rule until her supporters were able to organize enough support to form a viable government.

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[] In Orissa, a new government is to be installed next week under a chief minister who may be closer to the Prime Minister's son than to her. The last government, headed by a chief minister who had once been a protege of the Prime Minister, fell earlier this month under pressure from Sanjay Gandhi's followers.

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[] The Gandhis still face problems in two important states. In Tamil Nadu, a local party probably remains stronger than the Congress, and the Prime Minister continues to keep the state under direct central rule.

[] In West Bengal, the chief minister, although a Congress Party member, is at odds with the Gandhis. He appears to have survived an attempt to oust him, presumably because the Prime Minister concluded that blatant interference in the state's politics would create too many problems, including possible rioting. The US embassy nonetheless believes the chief minister's days in office are numbered.

USSR: Bukovsky-Corvalan Exchange

[] Soviet dissidents have reacted with pleasure to the release of Vladimir Bukovsky but are astonished that Moscow agreed to exchange him for jailed Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalan.

[] According to the US embassy in Moscow, there is no consensus among the dissidents as to why Moscow agreed to the exchange, but most of them were surprised that the Soviets were willing to make a concession in return for Corvalan's release. They felt that Corvalan in the long run would have been more useful to the USSR as a jailed martyr than as an exile living in the Soviet Union.

[] A majority of the dissidents believe that a Soviet desire to give General Secretary Brezhnev's 70th birthday celebrations on December 19 an added fillip was an important reason for going along with the exchange. A minority view is that Moscow was signaling President-elect Carter that it might be willing to exercise greater leniency in human rights matters, particularly through quid pro quo arrangements. Few dissidents believe that pressure from Western public opinion played a major role in this case.

[] Most of the dissidents believe the exchange was probably a move that would not be soon repeated. Some have speculated that the Soviet authorities, in order to minimize the importance of the exchange for the future, might henceforth sentence dissidents to periods of internal exile instead of imprisonment. Moscow, they said, could then deny that a given dissident is a prisoner and thus a candidate for an exchange.

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